Legal Issues Relating to Electroconvulsive Therapy by Beresford, H. Richard
Cornell University Law School
Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository
Cornell Law Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
8-1-1971
Legal Issues Relating to Electroconvulsive Therapy
H. Richard Beresford
Cornell Law School
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub
Part of the Litigation Commons, Medical Jurisprudence Commons, and the Torts Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Cornell Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For
more information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Beresford, H. Richard, "Legal Issues Relating to Electroconvulsive Therapy" (1971). Cornell Law Faculty Publications. 1651.
https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/1651
Legal Issues Relating to
Electroconvulsive Therapy
H. Richard Beresford, MD, JD, Denver
A survey of 54 psychiatric units
disclosed that 49 (91%) were using
electroconvulsive (ECT), principally
for major depressive illnesses. Dur-
ing the five-year period 1964 to
1968, fractures and other complica-
tions of ECT were uncommon. Sud-
den death was reported in seven
cases. During this period, none of
the respondents or their affiliated
physicians had been involved in law-
suits relating to the use of ECT. In
general, suits for injuries occasioned
by the use of ECT seem to be de-
clining. Possible remaining problem
areas are the performance of ECT
without the prior consent of the pa-
tient; the failure to have facilities
and personnel available for manag-
ing cardiorespiratory emergencies
occurring during ECT; failure to
diagnose or treat an ECT-related in-jury; and perhaps the failure to use
ECT where the indications are com-
pelling.
SUITS against psychiatrists or
psychiatric hospitals occasionally
arise from the use of electrocon-
vulsive therapy (ECT). At one
time, some professional liability
insurers apparently thought that
the risk of injury from ECT was
so great that they were reluctant
to insure physicians or others who
administered ECT.1 The current
incidence of these suits is difficult
to ascertain. It seems reasonably
certain that the incidence has de¬
clined as the use of effective mus¬
cle relaxants has become more
widespread.2 While few such cases
reached the state appeals courts in
1968 and 1969,3-6 it is unclear
whether they accurately reflect the
extent of litigation in this area.
Most professional liability cases
are settled before trial and only a
small fraction ever go as far as a
state appeals court. Professional
liability insurers are reluctant to
release information about the num¬
ber and type of cases they settle out
of court. My conversations with
counsel for companies which write
malpractice insurance policies indi¬
cate that suits against psychiatrists
for injuries arising from ECT are
uncommon. Even though suits relat¬
ing to ECT are probably waning, it
is still predictable that occasional
patients who incur injury during or
after ECT will bring suits against
allegedly culpable physicians or hos¬
pitals.
This study surveys the recent
experience with ECT in a loosely
selected group of psychiatric units,
and, against this background, raises
and briefly discusses some of the
legal issues relating to ECT.
Survey
Methods.—A questionnaire was
sent to the directors of 90 psychi¬
atric units, approximately equally
divided between large state hospi¬
tals and hospitals or services asso¬
ciated with university medical
centers. The questionnaire posed
several inquiries with respect to
the use of ECT in these units,
including questions relating to
any legal actions arising from the
use of ECT. Replies were received
from 54 directors of units, the
average daily census of which
ranged from 15 to 9,000 patients
(mean 1,028). Thirty responses
were from state hospitals and 24
were from university hospital psy¬
chiatric units.
Results.—Forty-nine of the re¬
spondents were using ECT at the
time of the survey in late 1969 and
early 1970, or 91%. In this group
of 49, use of ECT in 1968 (the
most recent year for which full
records were available) had in¬
creased over previous years in five
units, decreased in 30 units, and
had not changed substantially in
14 units. During 1968 alone, over
9,000 patients had received ECT at
the reporting units. Depressive
psychoses (especially involutional
depressions) were the principal
indications for the use of ECT in
all the units. In several units, ECT
was used in treating catatonic re¬
actions or extreme agitation in
schizophrenics. ECT was rarely
used in other types of cases, such
as agitated organic dementias or
severe neuroses. All respondents
using ECT regarded it as a highly
effective or superior form of treat¬
ment for major depressive illness¬
es. Of the five units not using
ECT, one was a small university
psychiatric service treating main¬
ly adolescent patients. Four were
large state hospitals. The director
of one of these indicated that his
unit had stopped using ECT in
1962 and had not resumed its use
because other satisfactory treat¬
ments were available. All the units
employing ECT at the time of this
survey plan to continue its use in
the foreseeable future.
In the matter of obtaining con¬
sent for the use of ECT, 36 of the
respondents had governing regula¬
tions requiring that they obtain
before treatment a consent to ECT
from each patient or his legal rep¬
resentative. Three units had rules
which permitted them to perform
ECT without the consent of pa¬
tients or their legal representatives
only if the patients were under in¬
voluntary commitment orders. Ten
units had no rules requiring ad¬
vance consent to ECT, but most of
these customarily sought such con¬
sent. However, during 1968 eight
units did use ECT in a few cases
without the consent of patient or
his legal representative.
Forty-five of the 49 units em¬
ploying ECT currently use paralyt¬
ic agents (eg, succinylcholine) to
achieve muscular relaxation dur¬
ing induced seizures. Twenty-eight
use some form of general anesthe-
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sia, most frequently a short-acting
barbiturate (eg, methohexital [Brev-
ital, Britan]). Many use atropine.
At all units, a licensed physician is
present during the induced seizures.
In most units where general anes¬
thesia is employed, anesthesiologists
administer it.
During the five-year period 1964-
1968, inclusive, vertebral fractures
were the most common complication
of ECT. The respondents reported
35 of these in a total of several
thousand treatments (exact figures
not ascertainable from data pro¬
vided). Only one hip fracture was
recorded. Cardiac arrhythmias oc¬
curred in 13 patients, and in three
cases led to death of the patients.
Sudden death occurred in four other
patients, but the causes were not
stated. Slight burns occurred in
seven patients, and a variety of other
complications occurred in one or two
patients, including a dislocated
shoulder, a mandibular dislocation,
broken teeth, and aspiration pneu¬
monia.
None of the units reported that,
during the period 1964-1968, any
lawsuit had been filed against it or
any of its affiliated physicians in
connection with any injury in¬
curred during ECT. In addition,
none of the respondents or affiliated
physicians suffered an adverse courtjudgment or reached an out-of-court
settlement with any claimant in con¬
nection with such an injury. How¬
ever, these findings do not necessar¬
ily imply that the units which did
not respond to the questionnaire had
had such a favorable experience
with respect to litigation or settle¬
ments. Moreover, since several of
the responding units were agen¬
cies of their respective states, many
were immune from suits in any
event.
Legal Issues
There are several legal grounds
on which a patient may rely in
pressing a suit relating to ECT.
ECT Not Indicated.—If a pa¬
tient sustains an injury during
ECT, the indication for which was
not a generally accepted one, he
might possibly prevail in a suit
against the physician who ordered
the treatment. For example, one
who receives ECT for an anxiety
neurosis might later contend that
he was negligently submitted to
the risk of his resulting hip frac¬
ture. There was, however, no re¬
ported cases in which a plaintiff
has won a suit on this ground.
ECT Too Risky.—A patient may
submit that his preexisting medi¬
cal status made ECT a prohibitive
risk for him. For example, in a
recent Pennsylvania case,5 an el¬
derly woman asserted that a psy¬
chiatrist's negligence in failing to
diagnose her osteoporosis before
ECT entitled her to recover from
him when ECT produced bilateral
hip fractures. After hearing testi¬
mony of physicians, the court de¬
cided that her particular form of
osteoporosis was not a contraindi¬
cation to ECT and that, although
the psychiatrist's failure to diag¬
nose it before ECT was an error,
this error did not directly cause
her hip fractures. Despite this
decision, it seems obvious that a
cautious approach is indicated re¬
specting the use of ECT in a pa¬
tient with severe osteoporosis. Sim¬
ilarly, a patient with a history of
major cardiac arrhythmias may not
be a suitable subject for ECT.
No Consent to ECT.—One who
does not consent in advance to
ECT may contend that a resulting
injury is in effect an assault and
battery.7 In a few cases, plaintiffs
have raised this argument, but the
courts and other legal authorities
have generally rejected it.8·9 One
reason given has been that the po¬
tential therapeutic benefits of ECT
and its low morbidity justify
granting psychiatrists the discre¬
tion to use it without the consent
of the patient in cases where it is
clearly indicated.8 Another is that
the patient's voluntary submission
to ECT constitutes implied consent.7
However, it seems unwise to assume
that courts in states which have not
yet faced this issue will necessarily
sanction the use of ECT without a
patient's consent or that of his legal
representative.
A patient who consents to ECT
may, after an ECT-related injury,
assert his consent was not "in¬
formed" and therefore was invalid.10
To recover on this theory, he must
show that the risk of which he was
not advised was so significant that
his physician violated a duty to him
by not informing him.12·13 Occasion-
ally courts are willing to dispense
with the requirement that consent
be informed if there is evidence that
informing the patient of risks will
substantially worsen his psycho¬
logical state.13
ECT Negligently Performed.—
Before the near-routine use of
muscle relaxants with ECT, sever¬
al suits were brought by persons
who sustained fractures and other
injuries during ECT.13 17 The usu¬
al allegation was that the patient
was negligently managed during
ECT. The courts generally took
the view that fractures and dislo¬
cations were accepted or inevita¬
ble risks of ECT and that, if prop¬
er indications for the use of ECT
were present and standard precau¬
tions were taken, the injured per¬
son had no grounds for recovery.
Moreover, the courts in ECT cases
have been unwilling to apply the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitor,15·16 a
rule which permits a plaintiff's
case to go to the jury even though
the plaintiff does not introduce ex¬
pert testimony relating to a de¬
fendant's alleged negligence.
It may be that a patient who
incurs a skeletal injury during
ECT in a facility where muscle
relaxants are not used would pre¬
vail in a lawsuit on the theory that
he was negligently denied the
protective benefit of these agents.
In other words, since the generally
accepted practice is to use muscle
relaxants, deviation from this
practice is arguably a negligent
omission.
Another facet of the liability
problem relates to the use of mus¬
cle relaxants and anesthetic agents.
These increase the risk of cardiac
arrhythmias, hypotension, and as¬
piration pneumonia. Although such
risks are often not preventable, an
occasional case may arise where a
person who sustains anoxic tissue
damage during ECT will assert that
a physician's or hospital's negligence
was the root cause.
Negligent Management After
ECT.—Injured patients have occa¬
sionally prevailed in suits where
they have established negligence
on the part of those caring for
them during the period when they
were confused after ECT.3·1719 In
a recent Louisiana case,3 the court
found that a hospital was negli-
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gent when a patient who had un¬
dergone ECT fell while being led
downstairs by a nurse's aide about
one hour after ECT. There was
conflicting evidence about the state
of the patient's mental function at
the time of the accident, but the
court accepted the testimony of a
physician that she probably was not
"lucid" when she fell. This empha¬
sizes the importance of close super¬
vision of patients during their post-
ictal confusional states.
Negligent Failure to Diagnose
ECT-Related Injury.—Even if an
injury is deemed an accepted risk
of ECT, an injured patient may
nevertheless recover from a physi¬
cian who negligently fails to di¬
agnose his injury. Ordinarily, the
injured person must introduce tes¬
timony of other physicians to es¬
tablish the defendant's negligence.
But in a recent North Carolina
case,20 the court indicated that a
psychiatrist's failure to diagnose
a patient's ECT-related vertebral
fracture was negligent, even
though the patient did not intro¬
duce physician testimony. The pa¬
tient did, however, establish that
the standards for ECT prepared
by the American Psychiatric Asso¬
ciation stated that a patient who
complains of pain after ECT
should receive a physical examina¬
tion and x-ray. The psychiatrist
did neither.
Negligent Failure to Administer
ECT.—Whatever the legal risks of
administering ECT, there may be
situations where not using it will
raise legal problems. There are re¬
cent cases which suggest the pos¬
sibility of future suits against
psychiatrists or hospitals for failing
to administer ECT. In a District of
Columbia case,21 an involuntarily
committed patient obtained release
from a mental hospital on the
grounds that it had not afforded him
any treatment other than milieu
therapy. In a New York case,22 a
former patient recovered $300,000
from the state for its negligent fail¬
ure to give him proper psychiatric
treatment during the 14-year period
he was involuntarily committed to a
state hospital. These cases together
emphasize that psychiatric hospitals
have a duty to treat their patients
and the failure to treat may give
rise to a lawsuit. Thus, a patient
who is involuntarily hospitalized
for psychotic depression, and who
does not receive ECT might later
contend that the hospital negligent¬
ly omitted a medically indicated and
highly effective treatment. It is
speculative how a court would re¬
ceive this contention. But a general
impression exists that many large
psychiatric hospitals have afforded
their patients no treatment or in¬
adequate treatment.21 In this set¬
ting, some courts may be receptive.
Comment
The hospital survey discloses
that ECT is widely used, that it
has few major complications, and
that lawsuits relating to its use are
uncommon. In projecting about fu¬
ture litigation arising from the use
of ECT, certain factors suggest that
the legal risks of administering ECT
are not substantial. First, the effec¬
tiveness of ECT as a treatment for
major depressive illnesses no longer
seems arguable. Second, ECT-related
skeletal injuries are becoming rare
as muscle relaxants are more
widely used.2 Third, standardized
procedures have been developed
for performing ECT, which in¬
clude the participation of anesthe¬
siologists and the availability of
resuscitative equipment. Fourth,
given the efficacy and safety of
ECT, courts will probably contin¬
ue to regard ECT as a standard
form of treatment for psychiatric
disease rather than an exceptional
therapy which they must scruti¬
nize with scepticism.
Possible problem areas remain.
In those states where the laws or
court decisions do not provide
clear sanction, administering ECT
without a patient's prior consent
raises the possibility of liability
for unauthorized treatment. Where
general anesthesia or muscle re¬
laxants are in use, the ready
availability of physicians and equip¬
ment for managing cardiorespira-
tory emergencies is essential. The
liability of a hospital which fails
to have this type of support on
call is predictable if a patient dies
or suffers tissue injury because of
this omission. Where a patient
suffers an injury during or after
ECT, a basis for liability would
exist if reasonable steps were not
taken to prevent, diagnose, or
treat the injury.3.6,17-20 Finally, be¬
cause ECT has been such an
effective treatment, there is the
possibility that not employing it
where indications are present may
give rise to legal action.22
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